The Hidden Cost of Supply Chain Disruptions: Case Study of the UK’s Automotive Sector by Escaith, H. et al.
  SocioEconomic Challenges, Volume 4, Issue 3, 2020 
ISSN (print) – 2520-6621, ISSN (online) – 2520-6214 
5 
The Hidden Cost of Supply Chain Disruptions:  
Case Study of the UK’s Automotive Sector 
https://doi.org/10.21272/sec.4(3).5-19.2020. 
Hubert Escaith, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6936-3377 
Visiting scholar, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics (SUIBE); Associate 
researcher at Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS; Former WTO 
Chief Statistician, Spain 
Sangeeta Khorana, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8901-0050 
PhD, Professor of Economics, Business School, Executive Business Centre, Bournemouth University, 
Bournemouth, UK 
William A. Kerr, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5716-6261 
PhD, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, College of Agriculture and Bioresources 
University of Saskatchewan, Canada 
Abstract  
As the world economy has become increasingly integrated the spectre of transnational supply chains has 
become a central feature of globalisation. The smooth and unfettered working of transnational supply chains 
has facilitated efficiency increasing changes to business operations (such as just in time inventory 
management). The automotive sector worldwide has been at the forefront of internationally integrated supply 
systems. The European Union (EU) has, in part, been structured to reduce friction in Europe-wide supply 
chains through the single market. Transnational supply chains are at the heart of United Kingdom (UK) - EU 
trade, and the UK’s departure from the EU’s single market (Brexit) will increase friction in international trade. 
This case study of the UK’s automotive sector uses a social network approach to analyse supply chain linkages 
between the UK, EU and other trading partners, and how these could be impacted as a result of Brexit. We 
use data from Trade in Value Added (TiVA) and World Input-Output Database (WIOD) to map supply chains, 
estimate total value-added in exports and examine how Brexit is likely to impact the competitiveness of UK 
exports. Results confirm that the UK’s automotive sector is closely integrated with the EU. To offset the loss 
of UK’s export competitiveness after Brexit, trade facilitation measures complemented with a duty drawback 
scheme could be an option in the short run. Policy measures are, however, unlikely to replace the benefits of 
duty-free and frictionless access enjoyed under single market trading arrangements. This suggests that the UK 
automotive sector, which is primarily comprised of globally active firms, may have to reconfigure supply 
chain arrangements and in the long run alter how decisions pertaining to locations are made. 
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1. Introduction  
Global value chains (GVCs) involve production where the output of a firm in one country is used by another 
firm in second country to produce a more complex product which, in turn, may be used by another firm for 
further processing before being consumed as the final product (World Bank et al. 2019). While trade under 
GVCs has become increasingly complex and internationalised (Baldwin, 2006; Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 
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2008) trade through supply chains have resulted in greater efficiency and lower costs (Antràs and Gortari 
2018; World Bank, 2020). Transnational supply chains are at the heart of EU–UK trade so much so that nearly 
50% of UK’s intermediate imports and exports are with EU member states (Department for International 
Trade, 2019). Further, intermediate goods and services account for a majority of both the UK’s imports from 
and its exports to the EU (Levell, 2018). There is considerable academic literature on the effect of Brexit on 
the UK and implications for global trade, and while the precise cost of UK leaving the EU is unknown it is 
certain that GVCs that connect the UK - EU trade will be disrupted. In addition to Brexit, the COVID-19 
pandemic has further brought the GVC interconnectedness and interdependence to the forefront, illustrating 
how export competitiveness is dependent on the sourcing of inputs and on access to final producers and 
consumers in third countries – an issue that we examine.  
Our paper contributes to existing literature in the following ways: first, it provides quantitative information 
on the position of UK’s exports and imports in GVCs, calculates the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
of exports, estimates the domestic and foreign content embodied in exports, as well as the degree of 
employment embeddedness. Existing literature on Brexit examines the overall expected trade and economic 
effects (e.g. Ali-Yrkkö and Kuusi, 2019; Cappariello et al., 2019; Gasiorek et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2018; 
Ijtsma et al., 2018; HMG, 2018; Borchert and Tamberi, 2018; Wyman, 2018; Portuese, 2018; Clarke et al. 
2017; Vandenbussche et al., 2017; Bailey and Propris, 2017; Brakman et al., 2017), and there are some sector 
specific studies (see Lobao and Santos, 2018; Bailey and Propris, 2017). Although Bailey and Propris (2017) 
examine the impact of Brexit on the UK’s automobile manufacturing sector this study examines short-run 
impacts and the effect of uncertainty on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and firm specific impacts. 
There are several studies that focus on the automobile industry (see for example, Xu and Liu, 2018; Rakita et 
al., 2017; Shende, 2014). Some highlight the high levels of competition and identify technological innovations 
as a driver of changes in this sector (Xu and Liu, 2018; Shende, 2014) Oher studies focus on how the global 
economic crisis and report that the 2008 crises had a strong impact on the global automobile industry (Rakita 
et al., 2017). Our paper uses the Organisation of Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD)-WTO 
Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) database1 and World Input-Output Data (WIOD) on Inter-Country Input-
Output (ICIO) tables for 2000–14 to provide an insight into the expected impact on the automotive sector. 
Another contribution of this paper is a detailed insight into the implications for future UK trade policy, which 
is particularly relevant in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the UK’s departure from the EU at the end of 
2020.  
The paper is structured as follows: section two provides an overview of the supply chain linkage literature and 
the linkages of UK supply chains; section three draws attention to how the UK’s automobile sector is likely 
to be impacted by Brexit; section four examines the impact of Brexit on UK’s export competitiveness; section 
five concludes. 
2. Relevant literature and methodology 
2.1 Characterising supply chains 
Globalisation has been characterised by increasing complexity of value chain relationships that entail diverse 
sources of inputs and multi-country distribution channels emanating from and terminating in points of 
manufacture. To examine the ramifications of these complex GVCs has required moving beyond neo-classical 
economic analysis into the realm of new institutional economics, transaction costs and supply chain 
management into a network analysis that examines complex interlinkages between countries (Hobbs, 1996). 
Kano et al. (2020) conduct an exhaustive review based on a comparative institutional perspective that 
encompasses critical governance issues at the micro- and macro-levels. Earlier literature debates the evolution 
of supply chains, and the impact on production of trade links between countries leading to an increasingly 
dense international trade network of intermediate inputs that include parts and components, natural resources 
and business services (Gereffi et al., 2005; UNCTAD, 2013; OECD, 2012; Nielson et al., 2014; Coe and 
Yeung, 2015; WTO, 2017). The evolution of GVCs and impact on production from GVCs links between 
countries has been examined through the lens of an increasingly dense international network of intermediate 
inputs that include parts and components, natural resources and services (Gereffi et al., 2005). Studies 
 
1 TiVA database, developed by the OECD-WTO, provides indicators on trade in value added for all OECD, EU-28 and G20 countries, 
most East and South-east Asian economies and a selection of South American countries. 
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examining the impact of Brexit take the EU-UK GVCs into account and use different analytical frameworks. 
For example, Vandenbussche et al. (2017) estimate a gravity model in value added, featuring sector-level 
input-output production linkages. Pisani and Caffarelli (2018) develop a dynamic model with tradeable 
intermediate goods and services (as well as intermediate non-tradeable services) calibrated for the euro area 
and the UK, and assess the effects of alternative tariff scenarios.2 Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2013) suggest 
that the GVCs extend across the developed and developing countries, mainly in regional blocs, commonly 
called Factory Asia, Factory North America, and Factory Europe. Johnson and Noguera (2012) explain 
regionalisation by geographical distance that impacts value-added trade flows across countries.  
The GVC literature is characterised under three strands: the first two are based on theoretical issues regarding 
supply chains, and the third comprises  of empirical explorations. The first strand holds that increasingly 
complex supply chains are a sign of increased efficiency in the globalised system of production. It argues that 
comparative advantage is changing and that the change arises from the easing of trade in intermediate inputs 
(Baldwin, 2012; Ali and Durash, 2011). Blanchard et al. (2016) find that countries well integrated in GVCs 
exhibit lower tariff protection. The second strand takes a firm level approach and finds networked 
multinational firms have a growing importance in global trade (Keane, 2014). It has been found that lead firms 
(from China and India, in particular) have market power and are able to use that advantage in negotiations 
with suppliers, primarily those from developing countries (Bigsten et al., 2000; Gereffi et al. 2005; Nolan and 
Zhang, 2010; Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Nielson, 2014; Nadvi and Horner, 2018). The third stand of 
literature attempts to empirically disentangle the domestic and foreign content of countries’ trade. The 
methods employed to examine inter-industrial networks, mainly input-output (IO) matrices, are in line with 
the vertical specialisation concept proposed by Hummels et al. (2001). Studies examining the position of 
countries within global production networks estimate the domestic value-added content of a bundle of exports, 
i.e. vertical specialisation (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2013; Timmer et al., 2014; Koopman, et al., 2014). 
Acemoglu et al. (2012) suggest the importance of network centrality and examine the cascade effect arising 
from a shock.  
2.2 Data and methodology 
This paper adapts social network approach to analyse GVC relationship between the UK and its trading 
partners. Escaith (2014) relates GVC decomposition with network analysis. Recent works by Ignatenko et al. 
(2019) and Ahmad (2019) use the GVC lens to examine the complex network structure of flows of goods, 
services, capital and technology across national borders. Koopman et al. (2014) propose the decomposition of 
total gross exports by source and destination of the embedded value added. Borin and Mancini (2017) 
introduce the ‘follow-the-value-added’ methodology that refines and corrects Koopman et al. (2014) analysis, 
making possible a proper investigation of the bilateral, as well as sectoral, dimension of trade flows and an 
analysis of a country’s backward and forward linkages within the GVC.  
Data for our paper are taken from the OECD-WTO TiVA database that reports value-added data on 62 
countries for 12 sectors of goods and services (see Annex table A.1 for sector aggregation). We also use the 
World Input-Output Data (WIOD) with annual world IO tables for 2000–14 (2016 release) and  
UNCOMTRADE bilateral trade data to map supply chain linkages (inputs and finished) to trace the origin 
(sectoral and geographic) of the value-added embodied in goods and services. Finally, the decomposition of 
employment provided by an economy through exports draws on Miroudot (2016), which matches 
classifications and business functions for 37 countries between 1995–2013. The average tariffs, on 
intermediate and final goods traded between the EU and the UK, are based on the methodology developed in 
Cappariello (2017). We compute the indirect costs of tariffs following the works of Miroudot et al. (2013). 
We derive a set of network indicators such as revealed comparative advantage (RCA), economic weight, 
connections between countries as measured by indegree and outdegree (i.e. the number of trade flows pointing 
to or from a node weighted by trade flows), eigenvector centrality (measure of distance between a country 
and farthest trade partner) and PageRank ‒ a probabilistic score based on a hierarchy of nodes by link 
popularity and where a node is ranked higher if there are more links pointing to it. 
 
2 Other interesting studies on Brexit are Dhingra et al. (2017) and OECD (2016), which do not explicitly feature GVCs, and Rojas-
Romagosa (2016). 
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The RCA is ‘revealed’ because the calculation of comparative advantages is based on trade statistics: if a 
country has a comparative advantage in a given product it will specialise in exporting it. An RCA of 1 indicates 
a neutral position, i.e. the country’s export specialisation corresponds to the weight of this product in world 
trade; whereas scores higher/lower than 1 indicate an advantage/disadvantage in exporting the product. The 
RCA does not explain value chains given intermediate products are linked through a country’s production 
function. Product-space is based on a statistical association (correlation) that is based on similar know-how 
and resource endowments. This is based on the information provided by the Atlas of Economic Complexity 
(or “Atlas”). 
Indegree and Outdegree are trade flows pointing to or from a given node and weighted by trade flows (value 
of imports and exports). The weighted degree is the sum of imports plus exports. 
Betweenness centrality and eigen centrality provides an indication of partners’ dominance and influence 
(centrality). A country with higher betweenness centrality is likely to have more control over its trade network, 
due to higher trade flows. As Borgatti (2005, p. 61) states “the idea is that even if a node influences just one 
other node, that subsequently influences many other nodes (that influence others), then the first node in that 
chain is highly influential.”  
PageRank is a probabilistic score based on a hierarchy of node by ‘link popularity’. This is closely associated 
with eigen centrality. Basically, a node is ranked higher suggesting the influence extends beyond direct 
connections with the wider network. The PageRank score for a country is based on the probability that trade 
flows will go through the country. The rank value indicates the importance and “centrality” of a particular 
country as a trade hub. This importance can be related to the economic size, but also highlights the trading 
relationship with other trading partners.  
3. UK’ s trade-based supply chains  
The UK ranks tenth and fourth as an exporter and importer in global trade. Exports and imports are valued at 
approximately £661.7 and £629.4 billion, respectively. In 2015, 44 percent of UK exports were to the EU, and 
approximately 53 percent of total UK imports originated in EU countries (WTO, 2017). The pattern of trade 
interdependence is evident from UK’s imports from the EU – 52 percent compared to 22 percent from the 
next three most important countries combined - China (9%), USA (9%) and Switzerland (4%). Table 1 shows 
the importance of inputs and finished goods produced and traded by the UK.  
Table 1. UK’s position in World Trade Network: selected indicators, 2014 
Sectors by TiVA database 
Eigen 
centrality 
Weight 
indegree 
Weight 
outdegree Weight degree PageRank 
Betweenness 
centrality 
Agriculture (C01T05) 0.653 13044 4571 17615 0.003238 0.00004 
Mining (C10T15) 0.343 37315 36045 73361 0.001582 0.000075 
Agroindustry (C15T16) 0.878 55634 19250 74885 0.004243 0.000004 
Textiles (C17T19) 0.859 34314 11366 45681 0.004446 0.000008 
Wood and Paper (C30T22) 0.653 20147 15159 35306 0.003991 0.000024 
Chemicals (C23T26) 0.896 114647 96489 211136 0.003107 0.000007 
Metals (C27T28) 0.728 40918 25928 66847 0.002792 0.000019 
Electronics (C20T33) 0.832 72831 38808 111639 0.003608 0.000013 
Vehicles (C34T35) 0.605 96128 69766 165895 0.005308 0.000034 
Transport, communication and 
commerce (C50764) 
1.000 150009 132177 282186 0.003074 0.000001 
Business services (C65T64) 0.770 101150 197708 298859 0.004673 0.000013 
Health, education and administration 
(C75T95) 
0.687 26733 28322 55056 0.006401 0.000015 
Source: Authors calculation based on TiVA data and Gephi software. 
The UK dominates in services exports with a positive correlation between in-degree (importer) and out-degree 
(exporter) scores for services exports. Business services (C65T74) has strong export-weighted connectedness, 
while chemicals (C23T26) is largest in terms of its economic weight. The in- and out-degree weights are 
highest for cars/vehicles (C34T35) with a PageRank score of 0.00531 suggesting that the influence extends 
to beyond direct connections in the wider trade network.  The sector’s in- and out-degree weight 
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connectedness is attributed to the strong integration of the British and European automotive industry through 
complex supply chains that rely on just-in-time delivery of components from Germany and France. 
Product connectedness based on the revealed comparative advantage (RCA), calculated as a correlation 
between exports across countries enables identification of sectors with larger linkages to other sectors. The 
UK has a high RCA in financial services, mainly financial intermediation (C65T74). Figure 1 focusses on 
UK’s main RCA clusters in manufactured goods - cars, aircrafts and turbines (i.e. transport and related 
machinery), and medicaments and chemicals. The RCA of 2.1 for cars is attributed to UK’s integration and 
the reliance on pan-European supply chains for car components ‒ approximately 80 percent of UK-imported 
automotive components came from the EU27 representing 16 percent of the export value of EU27 car parts 
and accessories. Further analysis shows that 60 percent of UK-built parts and accessories were exported to 
the EU27 in 2018, accounting for 18 percent of the total value of EU27 component imports. 
 
Figure 1. UK’s Product space, 2016 
Notes: The product space (by HS-4 digit classification) depicts connectedness between products, based on the similarities of 
endowments required to produce them. The RCA compares the share of a product in country’s exports by the weight of product in 
world trade. Coloured nodes are products for which the RCA of UK is higher than 2. 
Source: Atlas of Economic Complexity, Harvard Centre for International Development. 
Despite a low RCA (0.73) in vehicles/cars the UK is an important exporter of transport equipment. The UK’s 
RCA is indicative of the large share of value that is embodied in UK exports and is attributed to components 
imported from Germany and France. UK’s imports include: Springs and leaves for springs; Other lifting, 
handling, loading or unloading machinery; Other articles of vulcanized rubber other than hard rubber; Parts 
and accessories of the motor vehicles: Safety glass, consisting of toughened (tempered) or laminated glass. 
The decomposition of employment embodied in UK exports draws on Miroudot (2016) that matches 
occupation classifications and business functions for 37 countries between 1995–2013. Table 2 reports the 
composition of employment embodied in UK exports by sector and origin, and distinguishes between the 
destinations of exports for trade with all regions. 
Table 2. Employment embodied in UK sectoral value added exports, 2011 
 
World 
EU NAFTA 
East & South 
Asia 
Central & 
South 
America 
Other 
regions Thousands % 
CTOTAL: TOTAL 6 588.2 100.0% 43.0% 19.2% 11.1% 1.9% 24.8% 
C01T05: Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing 
87.3 1.3% 0.8% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
C10T14: Mining and quarrying 39.0 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
C15T37: Total Manufactures 1 296.0 19.7% 7.9% 3.4% 2.3% 0.4% 5.7% 
C15T16: Food products, beverages 
and tobacco 
88.8 1.3% 0.7% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
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Table 2 (cont.). Employment embodied in UK sectoral value added exports, 2011 
 
World EU NAFTA 
East & South 
Asia 
Central & 
South 
America 
Other 
regions 
C17T19: Textiles, textile products, 
leather and footwear 
65.4 1.0% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 
C20T22: Wood, paper, paper 
products, printing and publishing 
136.4 2.1% 1.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.5% 
C20: Wood and products of wood and 
cork 
17.4 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
C21T22: Pulp, paper, paper products, 
printing and publishing 
119.0 1.8% 0.8% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.4% 
C23T26: Chemicals and non-metallic 
mineral products 
202.5 3.1% 1.4% 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 0.7% 
C23: Coke, refined petroleum 
products and nuclear fuel 
13.3 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
C24: Chemicals and chemical 
products 
101.9 1.5% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.4% 
C25: Rubber and plastics products 64.3 1.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 
C26: Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
22.9 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
C27T28: Basic metals and fabricated 
metal products 
167.8 2.5% 0.9% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.9% 
C27: Basic metals 46.5 0.7% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
C28: Fabricated metal products 121.3 1.8% 0.7% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.6% 
C29: Machinery and equipment, nec 170.6 2.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.4% 0.1% 0.9% 
C30T33: Electrical and optical 
equipment 
198.5 3.0% 1.1% 0.6% 0.4% 0.1% 0.8% 
C30T33X: Computer, Electronic and 
optical equipment 
136.0 2.1% 0.8% 0.5% 0.3% 0.0% 0.5% 
C31: Electrical machinery and 
apparatus, nec 
62.5 0.9% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
C34T35: Transport equipment 181.9 2.8% 0.8% 0.4% 0.3% 0.0% 1.1% 
C34: Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 
67.6 1.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
C35: Other transport equipment 114.2 1.7% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.9% 
C36T37: Manufacturing nec; 
recycling 
84.2 1.3% 0.7% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
C40T41: Electricity, gas and water 
supply 
29.1 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
C45: Construction 134.7 2.0% 0.9% 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.5% 
C50T74: Total Business Sector 
Services 
4 434.0 67.3% 28.9% 13.7% 7.8% 1.3% 15.7% 
C50T55: Wholesale and retail trade; 
Hotels and restaurants 
1 492.5 22.7% 9.6% 4.1% 2.7% 0.5% 5.8% 
C50T52: Wholesale and retail trade; 
repairs 
1 300.5 19.7% 8.3% 3.6% 2.4% 0.4% 5.0% 
C55: Hotels and restaurants 191.9 2.9% 1.3% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.7% 
C60T64: Transport and storage, post 
and telecommunication 
514.6 7.8% 2.9% 1.3% 1.0% 0.1% 2.5% 
C60T63: Transport and storage 380.3 5.8% 2.0% 0.9% 0.7% 0.1% 2.1% 
C64: Post and telecommunications 134.2 2.0% 0.9% 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.5% 
C65T67: Financial intermediation 379.2 5.8% 1.2% 2.1% 1.0% 0.1% 1.4% 
C70T74: Real estate, renting and 
business activities 
2 047.8 31.1% 15.2% 6.2% 3.2% 0.5% 5.9% 
C70: Real estate activities 17.7 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
C71: Renting of machinery and 
equipment 
27.0 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
C72: Computer and related activities 189.5 2.9% 1.2% 0.7% 0.3% 0.0% 0.6% 
C73T74: R&D and other business 
activities 
1 813.6 27.5% 13.7% 5.4% 2.8% 0.5% 5.2% 
C75T95: Community, social and 
personal services 
568.1 8.6% 4.2% 1.4% 0.7% 0.1% 2.3% 
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Table 2 (cont.). Employment embodied in UK sectoral value added exports, 2011 
 
World EU NAFTA 
East & South 
Asia 
Central & 
South 
America 
Other 
regions 
C75: Public admin. and defence; 
compulsory social security 
42.5 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 
C80: Education 134.1 2.0% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.6% 
C85: Health and social work 19.0 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
C90T95: Other social services 372.5 5.7% 3.0% 0.8% 0.3% 0.1% 1.5% 
C10T41: Industry (Mining, 
Manufactures and Utilities) 
1 364.2 20.7% 8.4% 3.6% 2.3% 0.4% 6.0% 
C45T95: Total Services including 
Construction activities 
5 136.8 78.0% 33.9% 15.5% 8.7% 1.4% 18.5% 
C50T95: Total Services 5 002.1 75.9% 33.0% 15.1% 8.4% 1.4% 17.9% 
C50T64: Wholesale, retail, hotels, 
restaurants, transport 
2 007.0 30.5% 12.5% 5.4% 3.6% 0.6% 8.3% 
C65T74: Finance, Real Estate and 
business services 
2 427.0 36.8% 16.4% 8.3% 4.1% 0.6% 7.4% 
Note: The estimates, based on national industrial averages,  could possibly over-estimate actual employment. While TiVA includes 
all firms, it is worth noting that export-oriented firms and first/second tier suppliers are usually larger and more efficient in the use of 
labour than domestic firms. 
Source: OECD Trade in employment Data Set: Core Indicators. 
The export producing sectors of the UK provided 6.6 million jobs, both directly and indirectly in 2011. The 
business services sector led with 4.4 million (67%) total employment against manufacturing that employed 
1.3 million (20% of total export-related employment) and primary sectors (agriculture plus mining) 
comprising only 2 percent; the remaining employment is in other sectors, mainly ‘administration’ and ‘other 
services’. The financial intermediation and manufacturing sectors account for high employment in value-
added. This is reflected by the fact that the automobile manufacturing sector employs 82,000 people in the 
UK supply chain and just 2500 automotive suppliers add £4.9 billion in value-added every year. 
Table 3 presents the sectoral distribution of UK employment supported by final foreign demand, i.e. the 
relative weight of value-added used to produce UK exports. Considerable variation exists across regions and 
industries that explain the differences in the final employment by UK’s export sectors. 43% of total 
employment in the UK’s export sectors is attributed to demand arising from the EU while 19 % of total 
employment arises from demand originating from NAFTA (i.e. Canada, Mexico and USA). The remaining 
11 % is from East and South Asian countries. The EU demand for UK labour-related value-added is in low 
wage sectors, such as primary sectors and fuel unlike Asia, where demand is in value-added manufacturing 
and financial services.  
Table 3. Sectoral distribution of UK employment supported by final foreign demand: 2011 
World EU NAFTA 
East &  
South Asia 
Central &  
South America Other 
CTOTAL: TOTAL 43% 19% 11% 2% 25% 
 Of which 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  C01T05: Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 58% 11% 7% 1% 23% 
  C10T14: Mining and quarrying 52% 18% 7% 3% 21% 
    C17T19: Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 60% 11% 9% 1% 19% 
      C23: Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 53% 25% 5% 2% 15% 
      C24: Chemicals and chemical products 42% 21% 11% 3% 23% 
    C27T28: Basic metals and fabricated metal products 35% 17% 12% 2% 34% 
      C27: Basic metals 30% 16% 14% 2% 38% 
    C29: Machinery and equipment, nec 28% 22% 14% 3% 34% 
    C30T33: Electrical and optical equipment 37% 21% 15% 2% 26% 
      C30T33X: Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 37% 22% 15% 2% 24% 
      C31: Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 35% 18% 14% 3% 30% 
    C34T35: Transport equipment 30% 16% 10% 2% 41% 
      C35: Other transport equipment 23% 17% 9% 1% 50% 
    C36T37: Manufacturing nec; recycling 53% 13% 7% 1% 26% 
      C60T63: Transport and storage 34% 15% 13% 2% 36% 
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Table 3. Sectoral distribution of UK employment supported by final foreign demand: 2011 
World EU NAFTA 
East &  
South Asia 
Central &  
South America Other 
    C65T67: Financial intermediation 20% 36% 17% 2% 25% 
      C72: Computer and related activities 43% 24% 11% 1% 20% 
    C80: Education 36% 21% 12% 3% 28% 
    C85: Health and social work 39% 22% 10% 2% 26% 
    C90T95: Other social services 54% 14% 6% 1% 26% 
    C65T74: Finance, Real Estate and business services 45% 23% 11% 2% 20% 
Note: Highlighted sectors (red shade) based on the 5 largest source of UK employment by importing region. 
Source: Sectoral value added based on OECD data. 
Given the current supply chain interlinkages between the EU and UK, Brexit and COVID-19 are likely to 
rebalance value chains and affect the level of employment in UK’s export sectors. The effect will, however, 
not be limited to EU demand but also that of other countries. 
4. Case study: UK’s automotive sector  
The automotive industry in the UK is the heavily integrated into the EU’s single market. The industry 
contributes 4% of UK’s GDP and the labour employed accounts for more than 10% of total employment in 
the manufacturing sector (approximately 325,000 workers) (ACEA, 2019). As a member of the EU’s single 
market zero tariffs apply. The departure of the UK from the single market and customs union could result in 
the automobile industry facing most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs under WTO commitments at 10% on cars 
and 2 - 4% on components. Estimates predict that leaving the EU without an arrangement on ‘vehicles and 
parts thereof’ could see tariffs of £1.3 billion applied to UK automotive exports, and of £3.9 billion applied 
by the UK on similar imports from the EU (Protts, 2016). This is expected to increase average car prices by 
over £2,000 (Ruddick, 2017).  
Table 4 shows that the UK ranks fourth as an import market after the US, Germany and China. Centrality 
indicators confirm that UK plays a key role as importer for many countries covered by TiVA. PageRank score 
of 0.0053 illustrate the deep integration of the UK with the EU manufacturing supply chain suggesting that 
any disruption to the current trade relationship will feed back through the UK economy. 
Table 4. Transport equipment: network indicators for top 10 importers, 2014 
Reporter In-Degree Out-Degree 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Closeness  
Centrality 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
PageRank 
USA 291 306 171 154 0.00004 1.00 0.6142 0.0136 
DEU 121 365 241 680 0.00003 1.00 0.6056 0.0067 
CHN 111 846 63 508 0.00001 1.00 0.5587 0.0046 
GBR 96 129 69 767 0.00003 1.00 0.6050 0.0053 
CAN 87 553 68 855 0.00003 1.00 0.5987 0.0053 
FRA 78 403 93 855 0.00004 1.00 0.6142 0.0046 
MEX 58 511 99 505 0.00002 0.97 0.5912 0.0037 
RUS 39 545 585 0.00001 0.89 0.5720 0.0017 
ITA 38 163 42 935 0.00003 1.00 0.5974 0.0018 
ESP 35 922 49 398 0.00003 1.00 0.6076 0.0018 
 
Notes: The reporters are ranked according to their In-degree score. Bilateral flows are weighted by the share of the bilateral flow in 
total vehicle exports of the reporter; bilateral flows smaller than 1% of reporter’s exports were not considered in the calculation of 
network indicators.  
Source: Authors calculations based on OECD TiVA Nowcasts. 
The foreign value added embodied in manufactured exports at the bilateral level shows that the non-EU 
countries are important export destinations for UK transport equipment (42% compared to 25.5% to EU27 
members). Thus, the UK’s importance as an export market is 18.6% to non-EU members, compared to 15.4% 
for EU-27 members (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Trade in transport equipment, weighted by share in reporting country’s exports, 2014 
Note: Arcs (exports) are weighted (size and colour, from blue to red) by the share of the bilateral flow in total vehicle exports of the reporting 
country; bilateral flows smaller than 1% of reporter’s exports were not considered in the calculation of network indicators and exports smaller 
than 3% are not shown. Nodes (import markets) are coloured by the in-degree score from blue (low score) to red (high score). 
Source: Author’s calculation based on TiVA Nowcast data. 
The bilateral market shares of UK and Germany are both 10% for transport equipment, and the UK is an 
important export market for France and Italy than these countries are for UK exports. The impact of Brexit on 
the UK automobile sector will vary across regions and countries. Given that the weight of the UK as an export 
market for parts and components is high for smaller EU countries, such as Cyprus (29%), Ireland (27%), 
Belgium (26%) and Denmark (17%), the relative burden of UK tariffs on EU imports after the UK leaves the 
EU in December 2020 would be particularly high for the EU countries listed above. 
Figure 3 shows that the share of domestic value-added in transport equipment exports (direct and indirect) in 
the UK is over 60% while the indirect value-added represents 54% of the domestic value-added. When UK is 
compared to Germany, the analysis shows that only 39% of all tasks are outsourced by Germany.  
 
Figure 3. Transport equipment: selected TiVA indicators, 2014 
Notes: DVA_X: domestic value added embodied in sectoral exports; DDVA_X: direct domestic value added from the exporting 
industry; IDVA_X: indirect sources of domestic value-added (outsourced to other domestic sectors); SERVA_X: share of services 
value-added (domestic and foreign) in total sectoral exports. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD TiVA Nowcasts. 
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For the UK, most imported content comes from the EU countries. The UK imports 67% of total inputs used 
from the EU for its automobile sector. Car manufacturers, such as Nissan, BMW, PSA (owner of Vauxhall), 
and Jaguar Land Rover, with production facilities in the UK, expect an adverse impact of Brexit on their UK-
based operations. Manufacturing data shows that UK car production fell by 47% during April 2019 in the 
expectation that the UK would leave the EU suggesting that the effect of Brexit talks was being felt. The UK’s 
biggest automaker, Jaguar Land Rover, announced 4,500 layoffs, which is more than a tenth of its workforce.  
5. Estimates on UK Losses when Exports lose Competitiveness  
Frictions reduce competitiveness of domestic firms when converted at international prices (Escaith, 2017). 
After the UK’s departure from the EU, tariffs and non-tariff barriers will lead to trade costs from tariffs and 
an administrative burden from customs clearing formalities and delays, and differences in standards and 
regulations between the UK and EU (Cappariello, 2017). Brexit and higher trade costs, which include higher 
applied tariffs, transportation and insurance costs, non-tariff measures (NTMs) i.e. border taxes and fees, will 
increase costs given the intermediate goods are imported and re-exported further downstream for additional 
processing before reaching the consumers. Estimating losses due to a lack of cost competitiveness is critical 
after Brexit when we examine this from a supply chain perspective. Strategies, to address lost export 
competitiveness could include duty drawbacks (the exporter can redeem the value of the tariff duties and other 
indirect taxes paid on inputs used for exports) and free export processing zones (industrial parks installed in 
fiscal enclaves). Assumes alternative duty-drawback scenarios for UK exporters we simulate the following 
scenarios: 
➢ Full duty draw-back allowed on imported EU inputs to all domestic producers associated with the value-
chain; 
➢ Partial drawback, i.e. only direct exporters, i.e. first and second-tier domestic suppliers that cannot benefit 
from draw-back schemes, are allowed duty draw-back on imported inputs, i.e. cost of imported inputs in 
export price; 
➢ Exclude any duty draw-back on UK exports to EU. 
Four additional scenarios with non-tariff measures ranging from 0%, 2.5%, 5% to 10% are simulated to 
determine the degree to which the pound sterling would have to be devaluated to offset the negative effect on 
competitiveness. Escaith (2017) suggests that the magnification effect of trade costs in supply chain 
production settings requires compensatory devaluation to preserve the current level of export competitiveness. 
For UK exporters to remain competitive, an option is to lower the factory-gate price in Euros accomplished 
through the devaluation of Pound Sterling. Given the domestic share of value-added is always lower than 1, 
a 1% increase in trade costs will be compensated by devaluation greater than 1%. For example, in the case of 
transport equipment, the direct domestic value-added share is 28% and indirect value-added share is 34%. A 
9% increase in EU tariff on UK exports requires a devaluation of the pound by 14.5% (9%/62%) to remain 
competitive. Thus, the lower the domestic share of value-added, the higher the devaluation will need to be to 
compensate for increase in trade costs. Table 5 provides estimates of the devaluation required for various 
sectors to retain the competitiveness of three important UK export sectors – automobiles, chemicals and 
electronics. 
Table 5. Compensatory devaluation required to mitigate the effect of increased trade costs with EU27 
Duty-drawback allowed Full drawback Partial drawback No drawback 
 
 Tariff and NTM  Tariff and NTM Tariff and NTM 
NTM (ad-valorem equivalent) 0% 2.50% 5% 10% 0% 2.50% 5% 10% 0% 2.50% 5% 10% 
Transport equipment 14.5 18.5 22.5 30.6 15.3 19.7 24.1 33.0 16.6 21.6 26.7 36.8 
Chemicals and non-metallic mineral 
products 
4.2 8.1 12.1 19.9 4.9 9.1 13.3 21.8 6.0 10.8 15.6 25.1 
Computer, Electronic and optical 
equipment 
2.6 6.1 9.5 16.4 2.9 6.5 10.1 17.3 3.5 7.4 11.3 19.0 
Note: Full drawback: all firms in the domestic supply chain can be reimbursed for the additional trade cost when exporting; Partial: 
only direct exporters can claim draw-back; None: no drawback allowed. 
Source: Authors’ estimates, based on TiVA 2014 data and Cappariello (2017) 
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After the UK’s departure from the EU, for the transport equipment sector to remain competitive in the EU, 
devaluation will be required to compensate for additional tariffs as much as 15 - 17%. The devaluation will, 
however, depend on any draw-back procedures that the UK may put in place to alleviate the burden of trade 
costs for exporters. If non-tariff barriers result in 5% additional costs, currency devaluation of 23 - 27% will 
be needed to preserve UK automobile exporters’ competitiveness into the EU. Should those costs increase by 
10%, the likely devaluation could be to be as high as 37%. Without devaluation, the automotive manufacturing 
sector will be severely impacted and existing supply chain arrangements will be disrupted. 
The impact of import tariffs on demand depends on price elasticity (Kee and Nicita, 2017). Given price 
elasticity for the transport equipment sector is low, this implies that the impact of tariffs on prices may not 
dramatically affect final demand. On the other hand,  NTMs will be a key factor after the UK leaves the EU 
on 31 December 2020, and the precise incidence of NTMs will be difficult to assess because border delays 
are likely to create uncertainties in delivery time - a critical parameter in supply chain management for car 
makers. While it may be possible for the exporters to pass additional costs to EU customers in the short term, 
overall competitiveness of UK export will suffer in the long run. This suggests that lower competitiveness 
may deflect future investments to other countries, as already seen in announcements by car manufacturers 
(e.g. Honda’s decision to move from Swindon and Nissan from Sunderland) to switch current production base 
from the UK.  
6. Conclusion 
Globalisation and the economic interconnectedness has been hit by Brexit and the pandemic risks delivering 
a knockout blow. As part of the EU single market, automobile manufacturers in the UK made locational 
decisions based on supply chain logistics that did not include trade costs among EU members. This made the 
automotive supply chains continentally integrated and the UK’s automotive industry facilitated manufacturing 
through the embedding of intermediate inputs from around the EU into finished car exports. Future UK-EU 
trade partnership negotiations are ongoing but concerns exist on the shape of UK-EU economic partnership 
and whether there might be barriers to trade should the UK leave without any deal or a shallow agreement. 
Lack of clear future EU-UK relationship could lead to UK-EU supply chain disruptions such that trade costs 
could increase from the imposition of tariffs and NTBs, given the automotive sector is heavily integrated with 
European automobile value chains. The UK’s departure from the single market will also bring changes to the 
rules of origin checks, customs delays, tariffs and, most of all, diverging regulations will harm automotive 
production. Given the reliance on in just-in-time delivery, any form of border delays can be expected to have 
far reaching effects.  
A virus-induced backlash against globalisation is inevitable and this, together with Brexit, is likely to bring 
major changes to the UK’s trade landscape. The supply chain disruptions from COVID-19 have accelerated 
calls for countries and trading blocs to ensure they have sufficient capacity at home. In the short term, 
reconfiguring supply chains may be difficult given that these are based on complex contractually binding 
inter-industrial arrangements that limit the freedom of firms regarding their choice of inputs (Baldwin and 
Evenett, 2020). Uncertainty about the future direction of trade policy as well as the future of technologies 
relying on fossil fuels have led to the automobile sector postponing strategic capital investment decisions, 
while decisions that cannot be postponed are likely to be biased in favour of non-UK locations. High 
transaction costs could lead firms to review supply chains arrangements and possibly to switch input suppliers 
in the long term. Given companies examine cost levels and service levels for nodes in their supply chains if 
transaction costs rise, firms may reconsider and review the current or planned node locations in the UK, as 
has already been the case with automobile manufacturing firms such as Honda, Nissan and BMW, among 
others. If unfettered access to the EU market has been central to the location decisions of automobile 
manufactures, changes in supply chain costs will be an important part of what the automotive sector decides.  
One possible option to safeguard UK export competitiveness is introducing a comprehensive draw-back 
scheme and exchange rate adjustment, i.e. compensatory devaluation, but given most components are sourced 
from mainland Europe and the share of value added is low, a higher exchange rate adjustment will be required 
due to the magnification effect. Given the UK’s departure from the EU single market is imminent on 31 
December 2020 duty drawback schemes could support offsetting higher production costs, but any such 
measures are unlikely to replace the benefits of the current duty-free access under the present arrangement. In 
the past, the gains from single market membership were higher in the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
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which led to structuring of automotive sector’s value chains. These gains cannot be ignored in the new UK-
EU trade arrangement and to ensure the survival of the automotive industry an agreement on the future trade 
options is imperative before the UK leaves the EU on 31 December 2020.  
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